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NOTE
ANALYSIS OF LARE WILL, 352 PA. 323 (1945), 42A. 2ND. 801f
by
Ben Branch*
In this case the decedpnt's husband was the proponent of. an alleged will
naming him sole beneficiary. The husband had probated the will and the matter
came into court on appeal by collateral relatives from the decree of probate. The
alleged will was written on the face of a blank bank check. The contestants
alleged forgery, first by questioning the genuiness of Mrs. Lare's signature, and
then by contending that, if the signature was genuine, yet her husband had gotten
possession of the blank bank check already bearing that signature and had fraudulently typed the body of the will on that check.
The hearing to determine whether or not an issue devisavit vel non should be
allowed was held before Judge Milholland of the Allegheny County court, who
found and ruled that the will was a forgery and for that reason declined to award
an issue. In this he was sustained by the Orphans' Court in banc. The appeal
to the Supreme Court then was taken by Mr. Lare, the husband. The appellate
court reversed, but not unanimously.
On the appeal the majority'opinion was written by Justice Patterson; Justices
Linn, Stern and Jones were of the majority; Justice Stearne wrote a concurring
opinion; Chief Justice Maxey and Justice Drew each wrote a strong dissent. Because four opinions, two in vigorous dissent, were filed, the case has attracted considerable attention and has led many lawyers to assume that the majority decision
has disregarded and upset many precedents.
It seems to the writer that the majority opinion has established no new rule,
but that all that has happened is that the Supreme Court majority concluded that
under the peculiar facts of this Lare case it was not a proper exercise of discretion
by the local judges to refuse an issue. That no change in or departure from settled
f See discussion of case in "Judicial Function in Will Cases-An Epochal Decision" by A. J.
White Hutton in Dickinson Law Review, Vol. L., No. 3, page 104.
* LL.B., Dickinson School of Law; member of Carbon County Bar.
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law principles was intended is demonstrated in the concluding remarks in Justice
Stearne's concurring opinion that he joins with the majority (at 338), "... we
should continue to follow, and not depart from, our declared law and practice."
That the question on appeal turned on whether or not there was a proper application of discretion by the hearing judge and the court in banc is evidenced by
Justice Patterson's remark (at 330), "In determining whether there has been
such an abuse of discretion by the court below we have considered all the evidence."
The court reporter gathered that such was the purport of Justice Patterson's opinion, because in the syllabus he said:
"7. Upon appeal, the decision of the chancellor will be reversed where
there appears to have bcen an abuse of discretion."
Justice Drew commences his vigorous dissent by saying, "The learned chancellor,
Judge Mulholland, did not abuse his judicial discretion."
While the majority opinion does not make a complete catalog or schedule
of the facts in support of the will and those opposed, mention is made therein of
many of the facts, some pro and some con, so as to indicate the nature of the dispute and that it was sufficiently substantial to call for an issue and trial before a
chancellor with a jury. All of the facts are not referred to in Justice Patterson's
opinion, as we find additional facts referred to in the three additional opinions.
After mentioning favorable and unfavorable elements, Justice Patterson
stated that the function of a hearing judge is, ".

.

. to determine whether there is a

substantial dispute upon a material matter of fact"; that if there is such a dispute
an issue must be awarded; that there was such a dispute in the Lare case arising out
of the evidence; and that, therefore, it was an abuse of discretion then to rule finally
that the will was a forgery, instead of which the question should be investigated
anew on the trial of an issue by a trial judge or chancellor sitting with a jury.
Justice Stearne in his concurring opinion concisely states what the divergence
was between the five justices who prevailed and the two who dissented, his language
being (at 331):

"The majority have decided that the exclusive function of such hearing
judge is to determine whether there exists a substantial dispute of fact.
The minority view is that the hearing judge may conclude, despite the
testimony, that he would not support a verdict of a jury and therefore
no substantial dispute exists."
He said that misleading expressions appeared in many cases, particularly in those
wherein the Orphans' Court had to decide whether or not a dispute was substantial
and in cases where the courts had to define the functions of a trial judge when
alone passing on issues of fact. Justice Stearne, agreeing with language previous.
ly used by Justice Stern, stated that the hearing judge is not a jury acting as an
"ultimate fact-finding tribunal"; instead he is to decide only "whether there is
a substantial dispute upon a material matter of fact," so thai a jurys verdict either
way would not have to be set aside as against the weight of the evidence.
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Justice Stearne said that the mistake made in the court below consisted in
Judge Mulholland's first making a finding of fact, notwithstanding substantial
conflict in the evidence, that the Lare will was a forgery in two particulars, and
then in concluding as a matter of law that because of such finding of fact he could
not uphold a verdict sustaining the will; that consequently no substantial dispute
was presented. He also stated (at 333) that " the dispute must be substantial
and not a mere conflict in the testimony," and illustrated such statement of the
law by mentioning a hypothetical factual situation, in which connection he probably had in mind cases like Berg's Est., 173 Pa. 647, and Malunny's Est., 208 Pa.
21 where there were disputes as to the genuineness of the signatures, but the evidence in support of them so outweighed that which denied them that there were no
substantial disputes justifying issues.
Justice Stearne continuing, and, for the purpose of distinguishing between
the functions of a hearing judge and a trial judge, stated (at 334):
"The trial judge, who sits to determine an issue devisavit vel non, acts
as a chancellor. He is not bound by a verdict when it is against the
manifest weight of the evidence, which is addressed to him quite as
much as to the jury. If his professional and official conscience is not
satisfied that it is sufficient to sustain a verdict against the will, either
because it lacks probative force or inadequacy, it becomes his duty to
set the verdict aside: ..."
According to Justice Stearne, and the cases abundantly support him in that,
the hearing judge may either grant the issue, refuse it and uphold the will, or
refuse it and strike down the will, depending on whether or not there is a substantial dispute on a material fact.
Continuing, he said (at 336),

"...

the hearing judge must weigh the evidence

in order to ascertain whether the dispute is substantial. Beyond this he may not
go." He points out that the county judge found as a fact that there was a double
forgery, although there was no direct evidence thereon produced by either side, the
only evidence being either circumstantial or opinion.
After reviewing some of the facts Justice Stearne says that he cannot agree
with the minority contention that no verdict sustaining the Lare will could be
permitted to stand, so that there should be no jury trial, but that if on jury trial
the facts then should justify the rejection of the will the trial judge or the appellate
court can do so even if the jury's verdict should sustain it.
What seems to have controlled with the Supreme Court majority, including
Justice Stearne, appears in remarks of the latter justice (at 336). The hearing
judge made the strange finding of fact that Lare first had forged his wife's signature
and then had written the body of the will over that forged signature! Even if
the whole instrument, body and signature, should be a forgery, it would be difficult to believe that the forged signature was written before the body was typed.
But the evidence was quite persuasive that Mrs. Lare's signature was genuine. If it
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was so genuine, then, as the hearing judge said and justice Stearne repeated, no
witness had direct knowledge of the forgery and the only additional evidence was
circumstantial and opinion, of which additional evidence some supported and
some impugned the will. Thus in support of the will there was the signature
quite likely genuine, plus circumstances and opinions of probative force, and
opposed to genuineness there were only circumstances and opinions of like force, so
because thereof, Justice Stearne said, the hearing judge should not have rejected
the will.
Chief Justice Maxey commences his dissent by stating that all the justices agree
that the law is settled that the Orphans' Court has the right to decide in a will case
whether or not an issue to determine the validity of an alleged will should be
awarded. Obviously the right which the justice thus refers to is not an absolute
right, but one limited by a sound judicial discretion. He then repeats the well
known principle that before an issue is awarded there must be a substantial dispute
upon a material matter of fact, that is, that the party who succeeds in getting an
issue awarded must have more than a mere technical prima facie case.
The Chief Justice, mentioning the rule that an issue is to be awarded only
where the judicial conscience could sustain a verdict either way, proceeds by forceful, factual argument to show why he could not sustain a verdict in favor of the
He discusses twelve different circumstances tending to show, and
Lare will.
completely persuading him, that Mrs. Lare did not write or authorize the body of
the will. He says (at 338) that there are further circumstances in support of the
same showing and that equally conclusive evidence was present to indicate that
it was Mr. Lare who wrote the body of the will. In his argument on the facts
the Chief Justice looks upon Mrs. Lare's signature as genuine. However, he did
not discuss any of the circumstantial evidence that tended to support the will, much
of which supporting evidence is briefly mentioned in the majority opinion.
At page 349 the Chief Justice purports to quote from the majority opinion, but
his quotation is not correct. The majority opinion says (at 330):
"If a jury were to believe the evidence of" Mr. Lare, "a verdict upholding
the instrument as the will of Mrs. Lare could be sustained (italics
mine)."

For the language which here has been italicized the Chief Justice substitutes the
expression "would have to be sustained." His reference to such quoted language
of the majority, plus what Justice Stearne has said, lights up the whole case and
shows us that there has been no departure from settled principles, instead of which
the Justices differed on the factual effect of the evidence. According to the majority, Justice Stearne included, the evidence was such that the judicial conscience
could sustain a verdict upholding the will as valid, wherefore it was not a proper
exercise of discretion for the hearing judge to render a verdict or finding of fact
pronouncing the will a forgery and then entering judgment thereon declaring
the will invalid.
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The Chief Justice complains that when the issue should get to be tried before a jury the testimony would be just about the same as that which was given
before the hearing judge. That cannot be said with so much confidence. Very
likely both sides on the trial before a jury, and especially since they have had the
benefit of the Justices' factual arguments, will produce further testimony bolstering
their respective contentions and detracting from those of the adversary.
Justice Drew commences his dissent by declaring that the lower court did not
abuse its judicial discretion, and that same assertion is repeated several times in the
Drew dissent. Such reception serves to confirm the notion of the writer that
the reversal was entered and an issue awarded by the Supreme Court majority because five justices felt that under the peculiarities of the Lare case a verdict either
way could be sustained by the judicial conscience, wherefore it was a lack of discretion to refuse an issue and declare the will invalid.
According to Justice Drew (at 353), in a will contest before a hearing judge
the first thing to be determined is what issues of fact have been created, and then to
ascertain the extent to which the evidence produced has made those issues "the
subject of any real dispute."
Justice Drew discussed the evidence and the inferences which he made therefrom in opposition to the will, but in his dissent he paid no attention to evidence
in support of the will.
This dissent is based on and would apply to the Lare case the well known
principle that usually the findings of fact of a judge trying a case without a jury
have the effect of a jury's verdict if there br credible evidence to support such
findings.
Justice Drew (at 363) speaks of the presumption in favor of validity which
exists where the attack is based on undue influence or lack of testamentary capacity,
and states that that presumption does not apply where the charge is forgery. The
writer can agree that where tht charge is that of a forged signature no presumption favors the proponent, but he questions whether there might not be some
presumption in favor of validity where the genuineness of the signature is not
in real dispute, but it is alleged that the body of the will was written fraudulently
above such genuine signature. Where the paper is in proper testamentry form and
the signature is genuine, why should there be a heavier burden on the proponent
where fraud or forgery is charged than where the attack is based on lack of testamentary capacity or undue influence? Undue influence is a species of fraud.
Justice Drew concludes his dissent by saying (at 370):
" ...the manifest weight of the evidence clearly shows that the purported will is a forgery and the Chancellor properly so found. No
judicial mind, in my judgment, could have reached any other conclusion.
His findings are overwhelmingly supported by the evidence and therefore should be binding on this Court.
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"There is nothing in our cases which cast any doubt upon the two rules
of law I have defined and illustrated; first, that a Chancellor is required
to grant an issue d.v.n. only if after a conscientious study of the evidence as a whole he is not certain of the truth of matters in controversy;
and that he can and should refuse an issue and decide the case, if the
evidence, considered as a whole, has convinced him that one side of the
case is right and the other wrong; and, secondly, the rule that this Court
will not, in such a case this, overrule or reject any finding or conclusion of fact, or reverse any decree, which has been based by an Orphans'
Court Judge upon a conscionable, lawful appraisal of the competent
evidence."
Nothing appears in the report of the Lare case which to the writer's mind
evidences any purpose on the part of the Supreme Court majority to depart from
well trodden paths and adopt new doctrines. The majority passed on the Lare
case with all of its unusual features and passed on that case alone. There was no
intention to reject and the majority did not reject the doctrine announced in our
many reported cases as to the duties and powers of a hearing judge and the finality
of his conclusions, but did determine and declare that in the Lare case, with almost
certainly a genuine signature and with all the rest of the evidence circumstantial
or opinion, a verdict in favor of the will could have the approval of the judicial
mind, wherefore the lower court did not exercise discretion when it refused a jury
trial and rejected the will. The Justices were not in disagreement on principles of
law, substantive or adjective, but their division arose solely from divergent views
on factual aspects of the Lare case.

